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Missing Incomes in the UK:  
Evidence and Policy Implications 
 
Abstract 
Policymakers tend to ‘treasure what is measured’ and overlook phenomena that are not. In an era of 
increased reliance on administrative data, existing policies also often determine what is measured in 
the first place. We analyse this two-way interaction between measurement and policy in the context 
of the investment incomes and capital gains that are missing from the UK’s official income statistics. 
We show that these ‘missing incomes’ change the picture of economic inequality over the past decade, 
revealing rising top income shares during the period of austerity. The underestimation of these forms 
of income in official statistics has diverted attention from tax policies that disproportionately benefit 
the wealthiest. We urge a renewed focus on how policy affects and is affected by measurement. 
Inequality statistics – welfare measurement – savings and investment income – capital gains – top 
incomes – tax policy 
1. Introduction  
In the UK, the claim that income inequality remained broadly stable during the period of austerity that 
followed the Global Financial Crisis has had a major impact on political debates. Successive Chancellors 
cited official income statistics showing that the Gini coefficient and top income shares barely shifted 
during the 2010s (Osborne, 2015, Hammond, 2017). Reports by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, as well 
as articles in mainstream media, relied on these statistics to ‘correct’ the public perception that 
inequality had been rising (Hood & Waters, 2017; BBC, 2017). In 2016, Channel 4’s fact-checker 
website summarised that ‘Despite the rhetoric from the opposition benches, the official statistics do 
not support the view that income inequality has worsened since David Cameron became Prime 
Minister’ (Worrall, 2016). 
But as Richard Titmuss questioned in 1962:  
To what extent and in what respects do these statistics represent reality? How faithfully do 
they depict the changing constituents of income and wealth, and changes in rewards and ways 
of spending, giving and saving? … How valid are the concepts and the data in relation to the 
uses to which they are put? 
Titmuss’ target was official statistics showing how income inequality had fallen in post-war Britain 
(Titmuss, 1962). He pointed out that because the statistics were based on tax returns, they failed by 
definition to capture sources that were not assessable for Income Tax. Since the largest of these 
‘missing’ sources – particularly capital gains, various forms of investment income, and inheritances – 
were concentrated amongst those at the top of the income distribution, Titmuss argued that official 
statistics gave a misleading picture of the changing nature and extent of inequality in the UK. 
In this paper, we provide new evidence on UK income inequality over the past two decades. We show 
how many of the concerns raised by Titmuss more than half a century ago remain unresolved. In 
particular, today’s official income statistics still fail adequately to capture incomes from savings and 




the picture of economic inequality in the UK, particularly at the top. We find that top income shares 
rose during the 2010s, contrary to the prevailing narrative. Further, we argue that this failure 
adequately to measure capital income and gains in official statistics has stunted important policy 
debates by diverting attention from tax policies that disproportionately benefit the wealthiest. 
We make two main empirical contributions. First, we quantify the extent to which capital incomes are 
underestimated in household survey-based estimates of inequality, based on a component-by-
component comparison of UK survey and tax data on incomes. We show that the process of ‘top 
income adjustment’ – which seeks to correct the underestimation of top incomes in survey data – is 
substantially a capital incomes adjustment, and that official income statistics still miss capital incomes 
below the top of the distribution. Second, we highlight that the tax data currently used for the ONS’ 
top income adjustment fail to capture additional sources of income that are not assessable for Income 
Tax, most notably capital gains. Using novel access to tax microdata from HMRC Self-Assessment 
records, we quantify the impact of accounting for capital gains on observed trends in top income 
inequality. 
Our study of the relationship between tax policy and welfare measurement engages several broader 
themes within social policy. First, there has been a recent resurgence of interest in tax as a central 
topic of social policy (Ruane, Collins & Sinfield, 2020), following related calls to test the boundaries of 
the discipline (Farnsworth, 2013). Second, social policy scholars have recognised the need to study 
‘the problem of riches’1 by turning a critical lens on the top of the income and wealth distributions 
(Rowlingson & Orton, 2007; Rowlingson & McKay, 2011). Finally, our paper also contributes to a re-
emerging literature within social policy that looks specifically at the impact of (lack of) measurement 
on tax policymaking, for example in the context of ‘fiscal welfare’2 (Sinfield, 2020) and the taxation of 
intergenerational transfers of wealth (Nolan et al., 2020). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing progress on income measurement 
by academics and official statisticians since Titmuss’s intervention in 1962, highlighting some of the 
gaps that remain in the coverage of the UK’s income statistics. Sections 3 and 4 discuss our key 
empirical findings on missing investment income and capital gains, respectively. In Section 5 we 
conclude with some broader lessons for the two-way interaction between measurement and tax 
policy. We show how gaps in measurement matter for tax policymaking and how existing policies can 
end up constraining what is measured. We also offer some practical recommendations on the 
approach to measurement that aim to break this negative cycle. 
2. UK income measurement, 1962-present  
(a) The legacy of Titmuss and Atkinson 
Titmuss’s 1962 critique of official income statistics relied on the concept of ‘comprehensive income’, 
which includes all additions to wealth regardless of their source (Haig, 1921; Simons, 1938). Titmuss 
proceeded on the basis that, if income statistics are being used to assess relative living standards, this 
comprehensive definition is more appropriate than the narrower concept of ‘fiscal income’, which 
instead tracks how income is defined for tax purposes. The essence of Titmuss’ critique was that 
although the fiscal income definition used by official statisticians in the post-war period was 
 
1 As Tawney put it: ‘what thoughtful rich people call the problem of poverty, thoughtful poor people call with 
equal justice a problem of riches’ (Tawney 1913). 
2 The term ‘fiscal welfare’ was coined by Titmuss (1958) to describe tax exemptions and reliefs that are intended 




convenient – given their reliance on data from the Inland Revenue – it risked obscuring changes in the 
ways that wealth was accumulated from sources outside the scope of Income Tax. 
To highlight this concern, Titmuss painstakingly catalogued the sources of income that were ‘missing’ 
from official income statistics. Most missing sources arose because of structural features of the tax 
system: some sources were outside the scope of Income Tax altogether (such as capital gains and 
inheritances), and others were classified as income but were nevertheless exempt. In both cases, 
these incomes were not reported to the Inland Revenue and so were missing from the data used to 
compile official statistics. Although Titmuss made some effort to estimate the impact of these missing 
incomes on the true distribution of (comprehensive) income, a common refrain in his book was that 
such attempts were speculative or even futile, owing to a lack of reliable data. 
Writing in the Journal of Social Policy over a decade later, Tony Atkinson (1975) reflected on why 
Titmuss’ criticisms had yielded such little impact on the approach to income measurement: 
A 240-page catalogue of the deficiencies of the available statistics might have been expected 
to lead to major efforts by official statisticians or independent investigators to improve their 
quality, but in fact it has not… The failure of ‘Income Distribution and Social Change’ to 
provoke a more determined effort may stem from a certain ambivalence on Titmuss's part 
about the role of quantification. 
Atkinson focused on improving the measurement of income and wealth using quantitative methods. 
His legacy is a vast economic literature and a dynamic network of economists currently working on 
income statistics around the world, embodied by the World Inequality Database (WID), which 
Atkinson co-founded in 2011 (initially as the World Top Incomes Database). This strand of work has 
resulted in huge progress in income measurement (Piketty, Saez & Zucman, 2018): we discuss some 
of the achievements below. However, its focus on quantification has – in the UK at least – drawn 
attention away from some of the issues that Titmuss originally identified. This is because, until 
recently, it remained difficult or impossible to obtain any data on the income sources excluded from 
fiscal income. 
In this paper, we seek to combine the two strands of work initiated by Titmuss and Atkinson. We 
develop a critique of the UK’s official income statistics that is attentive both to the ways in which legal 
and institutional contexts affect the measurement of inequality and that applies the best available 
data and modern statistical tools to estimate the magnitude of these effects. Before setting out this 
empirical contribution in the following sections, in the remainder of this section we provide a brief 
review of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two main types of data source on incomes – 
household survey data and administrative tax data – and their current application in the UK’s official 
income statistics. 
(b) The UK’s official income statistics: a hybrid approach 
A key advantage of survey data is that it is not limited to the fiscal definition of income. Instead, 
household surveys typically apply the ‘Canberra’ income definition resulting from recommendations 
developed by the UN to improve international comparability of statistics. This definition comprises ‘all 
receipts whether monetary or in kind … received at annual or more frequent intervals’ (UN, 2011). 
Survey data therefore include – or at least aim to include – sources of income such as non-taxable 
social security benefits, which are missing by definition from tax data. Survey data also allows incomes 
to be observed at the household level, and (at least in principle) covers a representative sample of the 
entire adult population, rather than only taxpayers. These features explain why household surveys are 




A known disadvantage of survey data, however, concerns undercoverage of top incomes. Top incomes 
are underestimated in survey data due to a combination of unit non-response and underreporting 
(Bourguignon, 2018; Lustig, 2020; Ooms, 2021). Tax data offer key advantages in both of these 
respects, because for tax purposes all individuals with income above the personal allowance (£12,570 
in 2021-22) are legally required to report their (taxable) income to the tax authority. Methods for 
supplementing or replacing survey data using tax data are discussed in detail in Jenkins (2017). Their 
application tends to result in significant upward revisions of top income shares, although these 
corrections have a more muted impact on the Gini coefficient (Anand & Segal, 2015; Bourguignon, 
2018; Burkhauser et al., 2018b; Jenkins, 2017; Lustig, 2020). There is an established consensus that 
tax data provide a better picture of top end inequality (Atkinson & Piketty, 2007, 2010). 
Although the official statistics that Titmuss critiqued in the 1960s were based on tax data, in the 1980s 
the UK began compiling its official series exclusively using survey data. Recognising the problem of 
survey undercoverage at the top, starting in 1994 with the DWP’s Households Below Average Income 
(HBAI) series, official statistics began to incorporate a ‘top income adjustment’ using tax data. The 
DWP’s adjustment was refined by Jenkins and co-authors (Jenkins, 2017, Burkhauser et al., 2018a; 
Atkinson & Jenkins, 2019) and a similar adjustment has now been adopted by the ONS as part of its 
Effects of Tax and Benefits (ETB) series (Webber & Beha, 2020). Consequently, both of the UK’s official 
income series (HBAI and ETB) are now based on survey data for most of the population, with an 
adjustment using tax data that is applied to the highest income individuals. 
(c) Remaining deficiencies in income measurement 
The UK’s adoption of a hybrid methodology for income measurement is world-leading, but there 
remain two important deficiencies, which form the focus of this paper. The first concerns survey 
undercoverage. Although recent work has identified missing benefit income compared with 
administrative (social security) totals, affecting the measurement of low incomes (Corlett, 2021), it is 
typically assumed that incomes are well-captured in survey data for most of the distribution. Recent 
analysis shows that in aggregate, survey undercoverage is only significant for the top few percentiles 
(Webber and Beha, 2020; Burkhauser at al., 2018a, Jenkins, 2017). However, this overlooks that if 
survey undercoverage afflicts certain types of income in particular, then for those individuals who are 
most reliant on these sources, the errors lower down the distribution could still be substantial, and 
important for policy purposes. 
The second deficiency is a direct reprise of Titmuss’s concerns. The tax data used to adjust top incomes 
in official statistics only capture fiscal income. It misses entirely (by definition) any sources of income 
that are not assessable for Income Tax. It is a reasonable hypothesis that these sources – such as tax-
exempt savings and investments, capital gains and inheritances – may be highly concentrated at the 
top of the UK’s income distribution. Recent evidence for the US shows that two thirds of all capital 
income is missed by administrative tax data (Piketty et al., 2018). Other international studies show 
that including capital gains and the retained earnings of the corporate sector can result in significant 
upward revisions to estimates of top end inequality (Alstadsæter & Jacob, 2016; Roine & 
Waldenström, 2012). Such comparisons are suggestive but the definition of fiscal income is highly 
sensitive to legal and institutional settings. There are no existing studies that attempt to quantify non-
fiscal incomes in the UK. 
These two issues highlight a clear need for more evidence on the UK’s missing incomes. In this paper, 
we focus on capital incomes and gains in particular – acknowledging that other areas, such as social 
security income and inheritances, also require further work. We argue that accurate measurement of 




for policy. If some income sources are missing from official income statistics, this will tend to reduce 
their salience to academics, policymakers and the public. In the following sections, we make the case 
that capital incomes and gains are indeed underestimated in the UK’s official income statistics, that 
this has obscured important trends in the distribution of income, and that in turn this has diverted 
attention from the active contribution of tax policy to top end inequality in the UK. 
3. Missing capital incomes  
(a) What is capital income? 
‘Capital income’ encompasses all forms of income received from owning assets, including interest 
from savings, dividends from shares, rent from property, and any other investment income. Capital 
incomes are conventionally defined dichotomously with ‘labour income’, which comprises all forms of 
income received in exchange for work. The distinction between capital and labour income can be 
difficult to draw in practice because, for example, a dividend paid to a small business owner may 
reflect partly their financial investment and partly their own effort. Nevertheless, just like labour 
incomes, capital incomes are clearly within the comprehensive income definition that we set as the 
benchmark for inclusion in income statistics. 
(b) Data and methods 
To investigate the extent to which capital incomes are missing from the survey data relied upon for 
much social policy research, we compare coverage in the Family Resources Survey (FRS)3 with publicly 
available tax data published by HMRC, known as the Survey of Personal Incomes Public Use Tape (SPI) 
for the period 1997-2017.4 The SPI comprises a stratified sample of tax records from HMRC’s self-
assessment (SA) and payroll (PAYE) administrative systems. According to HMRC, for individuals with 
income above personal allowance, ‘the SPI provides the most comprehensive and accurate official 
source of data on personal incomes assessable for Income Tax.’ (HMRC, 2020) Consequently, we treat 
the SPI as a benchmark against which to assess the (taxable) capital incomes that are missing from the 
FRS. 
It is not currently possible for researchers to link UK survey responses and tax records at the individual 
level.5 Consequently, in line with existing studies (Burkhauser et al., 2018a; Webber & Beha, 2020; 
Ooms, 2021), our approach is to compare totals for income and each of its components across 
equivalent quantiles of the total income distribution. This requires that we first harmonise the 
population and income definitions across the two datasets. 
To harmonise the population, we use individuals as the unit of observation, since it is not possible to 
create household units in the SPI. We also exclude individuals with (total) income below the personal 
allowance from both datasets, because of incomplete coverage below this threshold in the SPI.  
To harmonise the income definition, we use the SPI ‘fiscal income’ definition in both datasets,6 
excluding non-taxable income from the FRS data. Whilst in this respect the approach entails a move 
away from comprehensive income, it allows us to pinpoint the taxable income sources that are missing 
 
3 The FRS is used to construct the Household Below Average Income (HBAI) dataset, which in turn is used by 
DWP to construct one of the two official series on UK incomes. 
4 We refer to the tax year 2015-16 as 2016, consistent with HMRC’s labelling.  
5 We understand that ONS has plans to undertake this work in future. 
6 In line with Advani, Summers & Tarrant (2021), we also adjust the dividend income recorded in the SPI to 





from the survey data by providing a common denominator for comparison. We discuss the impact of 
non-taxable income on inequality statistics separately below. 
To compare the incomes captured in the survey and tax data on a component-by-component basis, 
we follow the definition of ‘total investment income’ (which we equate with capital income) and its 
sub-components (for example, interest, dividends, rent) as used in the SPI, and then harmonise the 
income components observed in the FRS to match these definitions.  
Finally, in order to construct quantiles of the full UK income distribution, we use the ONS mid-year 
population estimates (for individuals aged 15+) and adopt the income control totals computed by 
Advani, Summers & Tarrant (2021), which are defined on a fiscal income basis, consistently with our 
numerators. 
(c) The role of missing capital income in the UK’s top income adjustment 
As outlined in Section 2, both of the UK’s official income series now incorporate a ‘top income 
adjustment’, which uses tax data to correct the incomes of those at the top of the income distribution. 
Our component-by-component comparison of survey and tax data allows us to estimate to what 
extent such corrections to the survey data are attributable to missing capital income in particular.7 
We find that on average, over the period 1997-2017, around half of the total income imputed through 
the process of top income adjustment consists of missing capital income. As the shaded area in Figure 
1 shows, this share has fluctuated significantly from year to year, likely as a result of changes in 
taxation and the economic climate, to which capital incomes are highly sensitive. 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, missing interest income made up a significant proportion of all 
missing capital income; however, its importance has diminished since 2009, likely due to the 
precipitous fall in interest rates that followed the Global Financial Crisis. Meanwhile, missing dividend 
income has grown in importance and is now by far the largest sub-component of all missing capital 
income at the top. This trend coincides with the well-documented rise in ‘self-incorporation’ (i.e. 
providing one’s personal services via a company) that has occurred since the early 2000s (Cribb, Miller 
& Pope, 2019). 
 
7 The precise method of top income adjustment differs between the two official series. We follow the ‘quantiles’ 
method used by Burkhauser et al. (2018a), in line with the DWP’s current approach. Our adjustment covers the 
top 3% by total income, the same threshold used by the ONS (Webber & Beha, 2020). Unlike the ONS and DWP 
adjustments, we use narrower quantiles (of 0.1% width) and we do not apply the adjustment separately for 





Figure 1: The role of capital income in the top income adjustment 
 
 
Notes: The SPI dataset was not released for 2009. The figure shows the percentage of total income imputed by the top 
income adjustment that is attributable to each capital income component. For 1997-2004, the decomposition of capital 
income is partially imputed using tabulated data from HMRC’s Personal Income Statistics, as some capital income 
components were aggregated in the microdata in these years. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on FRS and SPI data 
 
(d) Capital income undercoverage below the top 
The top income adjustment used in ONS’s official income statistics does not adequately correct for all 
missing capital income, because a substantial proportion of missing capital income goes to individuals 
who are below the threshold of the adjustment (i.e. below the top 3%). As Figure 2 shows, the top 
income adjustment reduces the total amount of capital income that is missing (when relying on the 
adjusted survey data only) by approximately half. However, a substantial proportion of all capital 
income remains missing even after the adjustment, and this share has been rising over time, from 17% 




















































Figure 2: Total missing capital income, before and after top income adjustment 
 
Notes: The SPI dataset was not released for 2009. The figure shows the percentage of all capital income observed in the SPI 
that is missing from the unadjusted FRS data (‘before top adjustment’), and that remains missing from the series after the 
top income adjustment has been applied to the top 3% (‘after top adjustment’). 
Source: Authors' calculations based on FRS and SPI data  
 
In absolute terms, missing capital income is most significant at the top of the income distribution, both 
because incomes are higher and also because capital income makes up a larger share of total income. 
However, as Figure 3 shows, the proportion of capital income that is missing from the survey data is 
broadly similar – and substantial – across the entire income distribution. This highlights the 
importance of taking seriously the issue of missing capital incomes, as a distinct phenomenon from 
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Figure 3: Percentage of missing capital income, across the distribution of total income  
Notes: The SPI dataset was not released for 2009. The figure shows the percentage of all capital income observed in the SPI 
that is missing from the unadjusted FRS data, across different percentile groups of the total income distribution. The lowest 
group (‘personal allowance – P90’) excludes those with total income below the personal allowance because the SPI does not 
have full coverage of these individuals. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on FRS and SPI data. 
 
(e) Non-taxable capital incomes 
The SPI, which we use as our benchmark for identifying ‘missing’ income, only includes capital incomes 
that are assessable for Income Tax. Our analysis above therefore provides a lower bound on the true 
extent of capital income that is missing from survey data. A more comprehensive estimate would 
require additional information about non-taxable capital incomes such as those from tax-exempt 
investment schemes e.g. Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) and Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs), and the 
income from foreign assets owned by individuals who are resident but not domiciled in the UK (‘non-
doms’). 
At present, such information is not available to researchers. In some cases, such as ISAs and VCTs, 
relevant data is collected by HMRC; however, only aggregate statistics have been published, meaning 
that the impact on the distribution of income remains unknown. In other cases, such as non-dom 
foreign income, there is no requirement to report the income to HMRC, and so no direct data sources 
exist, either for administrative or research purposes. 
In these respects, hardly any progress has been made in addressing the concern first highlighted by 
Titmuss regarding the impact of tax-exempt income on inequality statistics. However, one major 
additional source of income (falling within the comprehensive income definition) can now be 
incorporated into income statistics, even though it is not assessable for Income Tax: this is taxable 






























4. Missing capital gains  
(a) What are capital gains? 
A ‘capital gain’ refers to the increase in value of an asset. In economic terms, capital gains contribute 
to an individual’s comprehensive income because they increase the funds available for the owner to 
consume. In this respect, capital gains are no different from other types of return on investments such 
as interest, dividends or rent. However, in the UK, capital gains are taxed differently from other forms 
of income. Capital gains are taxed only when they are ‘realised’ through a sale (or other disposal) of 
the asset, and the tax rate is substantially lower than under Income Tax. Moreover, some assets and 
types of transaction are exempt from Capital Gains Tax: we discuss these sources separately below. 
Even though capital gains clearly provide an economic benefit to the owners of assets, their impact 
has been entirely overlooked in the UK’s inequality statistics. Capital gains are excluded from the 
Canberra definition of income used in surveys such as the FRS. Because capital gains are not liable to 
Income Tax they are also excluded from the SPI. However, unlike the entirely tax-exempt forms of 
capital income outlined in Section 3, because individuals are liable to Capital Gains Tax when they sell 
or otherwise dispose of assets, HMRC does collect administrative data on capital gains. These data can 
be aggregated with information about taxable incomes to provide a more complete picture of the 
economic resources that individuals receive. 
(b) Data and methods 
To investigate the impact of taxable capital gains on inequality, we use administrative tax microdata 
accessed via the HMRC Datalab secure research facility. These data are not publicly available and have 
not previously been used for inequality measurement. The dataset covers the universe of individuals 
who filed a tax return – around 10 million people per year – including all those with taxable incomes 
above a set filing threshold (currently £100,000), plus all those with taxable capital gains above the 
‘annual exempt amount’ (currently set at £12,300). 
We first reconstruct the SPI definition of ‘total income’ within the administrative microdata. 
Combining this with the population and income control totals computed by Advani, Summers & 
Tarrant (2021), we are able to reproduce existing estimates of the share of all fiscal income that goes 
to the top 1% of adults (Alvaredo, 2017). We then construct ‘total remuneration’, by adding to an 
individual’s taxable income any taxable capital gains they received. To produce an income control total 
(denominator) that includes gains, we add the aggregate taxable gains reported to HMRC to the 
established income control. 
(c) Top income shares including gains 
In 2018, the top 1% (around 500,000 people) received 13.8% of all income, when measuring taxable 
income only (Figure 4). To be in this group required an income of above £125,000. However, including 
the taxable capital gains of these same people, their share of all income plus gains was 15.2%. This 
implies that each individual on average received an extra £47,000 in gains, in addition to their income. 
Individuals with very large gains but relatively low incomes are missing from the top 1% when ranked 
on taxable income only. Re-ranking the population based on individuals’ total remuneration (i.e. 
including gains), one in ten people from the ‘old’ top 1% (on income only) are replaced by these high-
gainers. The remaining nine in ten who were in the income-only top 1% remain at the top, indicating 




We find that when re-ranking the population on income plus gains, the share of total remuneration 
going to the top 1% increases even further: from 15.2% (ranking on income only) to 16.8% ranking on 
income plus gains. In 2018, the average remuneration of the top 1% was £85,000 higher than if we 
measure (and rank on) income only—just this increase is more than three times median income in the 
population. 
Figure 4. Top 1%, 0.1% and 0.01% shares, based on income-only; income plus gains (ranked on income only); 




Notes: The figure shows the share of all income going to the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of the UK population aged 15+, under 
different definitions of income, for the tax year 2017-18. ‘Income only’ includes only fiscal income. ‘Including gains, ranked 
by income only’ adds taxable capital gains to the definition of income but still ranks individuals on their fiscal income only, 
whereas ‘including gains, re-ranked’ ranks individuals on the sum of their fiscal income plus taxable capital gains. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets and ONS 15+ population estimates. 
 
The impact of gains is even larger when looking towards the very top. Focusing on the top 0.01%, the 
top share increases by 60%, from 2.2% when measured and ranked on income, to 3.6% when 
measured and ranked on total remuneration. This effect is mainly driven by re-ranking: before re-
ranking the top share becomes 2.4%. This highlights the extent to which including gains not only 
changes top shares, but also affects who is at the top.8 
(d) Impact on trends in inequality 
As we noted in our introduction, official statistics on income inequality have played an important role 
in shaping political narratives surrounding the austerity agenda that characterised the 2010s. The 
refrain that ‘we’re all in this together’ traded heavily on the claim – supported by official statistics – 
that income inequality had not worsened despite the cuts faced by those at the bottom of the 
distribution. 
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When looking at (taxable) income only, our analysis reflects the prevailing view that the top 1% share 
hardly increased during the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. However, once (taxable) capital 
gains are included, a different picture emerges: top-end inequality had not abated, just taken a 
different form.  
As Figure 5 shows, when gains are included in the statistics, the top 1% share was consistently higher 
and also rose through the 2010s. This pattern is exacerbated for the top 0.1% and 0.01%. Just as 
Titmuss identified over half a century earlier, the focus of official statisticians on taxable income 
served to mask an important shift in the way that the richest received their remuneration, distorting 
our understanding of underlying trends in economic inequality. 
Figure 5a. Top 1% share based on income-only and income plus gains (re-ranked), 1997-2018 
 






























































Figure 5c. Top 0.01% share based on income-only and income plus gains (re-ranked), 1997-2018 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the share of all income going to the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of the UK population aged 15+, under 
different definitions of income, for tax years 1996-97 to 2017-18. ‘Income only’ includes only fiscal income. ‘Including gains’ 
adds taxable capital gains to the definition of income and re-ranks individuals based on the sum of their fiscal income plus 
taxable capital gains. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets and ONS 15+ population estimates. 
The impact of excluding capital gains from inequality statistics is proportionally even more substantial 
when considering post-tax incomes. As we discuss further below, capital gains are taxed much more 
lightly than other forms of income. Consequently, the tax system does relatively little redistribution 
of gains. Figure 6 shows that whereas the tax system reduces the top 1% share of (taxable) income by 
30%, once gains are included it reduces the top share by only 23%. This pattern of reduced 
































Figure 6. Top shares of income and remuneration before and after tax, 2017 
 
  
Notes: The figure shows the share of all income going to the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of the UK population aged 15+, under 
different definitions of income, pre- and post-tax, for the tax year 2016-17. ‘Total Income’ includes only fiscal income. ‘Total 
Remuneration’ is the sum of fiscal income plus taxable capital gains, and re-ranks individuals based on this total. ‘Total 
income post-tax’ deducts Income Tax and National Insurance Contributions (excluding employer contributions). ‘Total 
remuneration post-tax’ additionally deducts Capital Gains Tax. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets and ONS 15+ population estimates. 
 
(e) Non-taxable capital gains 
Our preceding analysis using administrative tax microdata necessarily excludes the impact of non-
taxable capital gains, since these are typically not reported to HMRC. Largest among these are gains 
made on people’s main homes, followed by gains on assets held in ISAs, and those that are realised 
by making transfers to a spouse, a charity or on death (Corlett, Advani and Summers, 2020). Gains 
from any asset that are below the tax-free allowance – currently around £12,000 i.e. about half the 
median income – are also not taxable and typically are missing from tax data.  
These non-taxable gains are substantial in aggregate, although it unclear in which direction they would 
affect inequality measures. Gains on main homes are likely to be weighted towards the upper-middle 
of the distribution, making our estimates of top shares too high. However, other exclusions, in 
particular for gains on assets held within tax-exempt investment schemes (such as ISAs and VCTs), are 
likely to be weighted more towards the very top, and so push in the other direction. Without 
individually linkable data on non-taxable gains, it is not possible to know which effect dominates.  
5. Conclusion  
An established literature has addressed the production and communication of statistics as a ‘general 
sociological phenomenon’ (Espeland & Stevens, 2008; Berman & Hirschman, 2018). However, the 
interaction between measurement and policymaking, specifically, remains relatively underexplored (a 
recent exception is Sinfield, 2020). We urge renewed attention to this issue within social policy, 
reprising the agendas of Titmuss and Atkinson, amongst others. Our analysis of missing capital 
























choices. In this final section, we develop the implications of our case study for the relationship 
between measurement and tax policymaking more generally, before concluding with some 
recommendations on the approach to measurement by official statisticians. 
(a) The impact of measurement on policy 
Political debates about the tax system typically gravitate towards the headline rates of Income Tax 
levied on wages. The Labour government’s decision to raise the top rate of Income Tax to 50p was an 
important talking-point at the 2010 General Election; the Conservative-led government’s decision to 
cut this rate to 45p has a been a prominent dividing-line between the major parties in each election 
since. However, throughout the 2010s there was relatively little public debate about the tax treatment 
of capital income and gains. These forms of income are taxed at much lower rates than wages. 
Additionally, capital income and gains can qualify for tax reliefs or exemptions that are not available 
on other forms of income.  
The amount of tax that people pay therefore depends not only on the total income they receive, but 
also where it comes from. Capital income and gains – the lowest taxed forms of income – are highly 
concentrated at the top of the income distribution, reducing the effective tax rates paid by this group 
well below headline rates (Advani & Summers, 2020b). One might expect that post-tax incomes would 
be distributed much more equally than pre-tax incomes, given the progressive rate structure of 
Income Tax. In fact, as we have shown (Figure 6), the UK’s personal tax system achieves hardly any 
redistribution at the very top. This is mostly due to the favourable tax treatment of capital income and 
gains compared with other forms of income. 
The traditional electoral focus on headline rates of Income Tax can be explained partly by the fact that 
for large swathes of the population, wages make up their main or only source of income. The lower 
rates of tax that apply to capital income and gains are therefore outside most voters’ own lived 
experience. But the underestimation of capital income and gains in the UK’s official income statistics 
has also served to divert attention from these forms of income. Statistics have the power to draw 
attention to phenomena that are beyond the perception of individuals’ own lived experiences, but in 
this instance our official statistics have had the opposite effect: reinforcing a misperception that 
capital income and gains do not matter for inequality. The failure of official statisticians to track and 
report on trends in the distribution of capital income and gains has had the (inadvertent) effect of 
distorting public debates about tax policy. 
The impact of (lack of) measurement on policy is also clear in the context of ‘tax expenditures’, which 
are reliefs or exemptions that seek to ‘help or encourage particular types of individuals, activities or 
products in order to achieve economic or social objectives.’ (HMRC,, 2020). A good example is 
Entrepreneurs Relief (now renamed ‘Business Asset Disposal Relief’), which provides a 10% tax rate 
on capital gains arising from certain types of business investment. This tax relief has cost over £22 
billion in foregone revenue since its introduction in 2008, of which more than half went to individuals 
who realised more than £1million in gains each. And yet, the intended outcomes of the policy have 
never been measured and the gains to which the relief applies (totalling £42 billion in 2017-18) are 
entirely missing from official income statistics. 
Titmuss referred to schemes like this one as ‘fiscal welfare’ (Titmuss 1958: p44-45). As Sinfield has 
recently argued ‘The ways that social spending policies are run by fiscal welfare through the tax system 
remain relatively neglected, while the costs and impact of public expenditure are constantly under 
scrutiny’ (Sinfield, 2020). We diagnose this problem as again stemming in large part from a lack of 




Public Accounts Committee, HMRC has recently committed to improving the available information 
about the groups and sectors benefitting from significant reliefs (Thompson, 2019). Within 
government, this is a necessary precursor to adoption of the ‘Green book’ standard of evaluation that 
applies to other forms of government spending (HM Treasury, 2020). Following Titmuss and Sinfield, 
we also urge a greater focus on tax expenditures as a field of social policy research and regard 
measurement as critical to this agenda. 
(b) The impact of policy on measurement 
The increased availability and use of administrative data for statistical purposes has huge potential to 
enhance social scientific research (Halford & Savage, 2017). However, unless used carefully with 
awareness of its context, reliance on these new data sources also carries a major risk. As we have 
shown in this paper in the context of income statistics, it is easy for academic researchers and official 
statisticians to forget the divergence between what one is conceptually trying to measure, and the – 
often very different – purposes for which the relevant data were collected, especially where 
pinpointing such divergences requires specific technical expertise (as in the context of the tax system). 
This was essentially Titmuss’ critique in the 1960s, and despite other advances in official income 
statistics, in this respect little progress has been made. The use of tax data to provide a top income 
adjustment to survey data is a welcome development but it is dangerous to think that the challenges 
of measuring top incomes are now resolved. 
We see two main challenges arising from the impact of policy on measurement using administrative 
data. The first is that administrative data are by their nature anchored to the policies that we already 
have. To explore broader concepts or options for reform it will often be necessary to supplement 
administrative data using other sources. Second, and relatedly, administrative data are often seen as 
a ‘gold standard’, in particular given their universal coverage over individuals to whom the relevant 
policy applies. However, in the context of income measurement, it is clear that ignoring forms of 
income that are not easily measured using administrative data is not – in practice – a ‘conservative’ 
or ‘neutral’ approach. Instead, it introduces systematic biases arising from the shape of the existing 
policy landscape. In the context of missing capital income and gains, the reliance on administrative 
definitions tends to be to the benefit of those currently advantaged by the tax system; in other areas 
of social policy this effect is likely to be reversed, further marginalising groups that are outside the 
scope of existing support. 
Within academic research, recent international developments in income measurement have 
pioneered the use of imputations to overcome a lack of data on particular sources (Piketty, Saez & 
Zucman, 2018). This agenda reflects a determination to allocate all sources of income recorded at 
aggregate level within national accounts, so that none are left ‘missing’. We welcome the flexibility 
embedded within the approach of ‘Distributional National Accounts’ (DINA), because so often the 
alternative is to ignore ‘missing’ forms of income altogether, which as we have shown, can have 
systematically distorting effects. On the other hand, the increasing reliance on imputations is not a 
panacea. First, institutional context still matters and is required to make sensible assumptions about 
how to allocate aggregates from national accounts. Second, DINA does not capture transfers that are 
excluded from the national accounts definition of income, such as capital gains and inheritances.9 In 
these respects, Titmuss’ concerns are not obviated by the DINA methodology; indeed, they may be 
more important than ever. 
 
9 Where capital gains in shares are attributable to the retention of corporate profits, such gains are indirectly 




Finally, we urge a shift in the mindset of government officials in the collection of administrative data. 
In the tax context at least, collecting data appears to be viewed too often as a burden and expense 
rather than an integral aspect of the government’s policymaking capacity. HMRC’s approach is, in 
effect, to collect the bare minimum information required to apply current tax legislation, justified by 
a perceived imperative of minimising compliance costs on taxpayers. As a result, government 
persistently lacks the information needed to model changes to the tax system effectively, generating 
a powerful force of inertia. We see an important role for official statisticians, working in concert with 
government departments, to lead an agenda for collecting the additional data required to evaluate 
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